



Modeling the human role in operational systems

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2 European projects

- TATEM - the design of new aircraft 'health monitoring' technologies
 - TCD role - developing human requirements for future technologies
- HILAS - learning from operational performance in flight operations & maintenance to improve aviation systems and technologies
 - TCD is co-ordinating HILAS - 4 years, 40 partners, 15 countries
- TATEM & HILAS are supported by the European Commission 6th framework programme

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Humans in systems integration

| System stage | Human role | Development focus |
|---------------|--|-------------------|
| No automation | Humans manage technology and system interfaces | Core technologies |
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
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| Integrated system design - 'system of systems' | Information systems link people and technologies in seamless processes crossing boundaries | Complex systems deliver operability for customer and society |

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System integration in aviation



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Models of 'humans in the system'



| Level of model | What does the model produce? | Operational functions enabled | Design functions enabled |
|---|--|---|------------------------------|
| Descriptive classification of human factors | Factors which potentially affect performance | Taxonomies for incident analysis, performance reports | Checklist for design support |
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
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
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


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


Process and performance



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- ### Beyond human error
- 'Traditional' error theory (eg Reason) has an internally consistent error typology, but..
 - How to access intentions?
 - What is the situation (of which people are aware) in which intentions are formed?
 - How do errors relate to 'the system'? Can one identify a 'latent failure' before it occurs?
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- ### The inherent ambiguity of error
- Two common definitions of error:
 - Failure of intention
 - System malfunction
 - This ambiguity reflects a confusion between the **results** and the **consequences** of action (conflation fallacy)
 - The consequences of an action (for a system) are the product of its **results** and the **context** in which it occurred.
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- ### What is a social (/technical) system?
- Normative regularities of social action
 - Ambiguity of *norms*
 - What should be done
 - What normally is done
 - In social systems with important consequences (eg aviation)
 - Relations of power determine what ought to be done - the *official* system
 - The contingencies of situated action determine what *is* done
 - The regularities of situated action create the *real* system
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The 'new view' of error



- The radical discovery of LOSA* et al.
 - *LOSA - Line Operations Safety Audit
 - Errors and violations are 'normal'
 - Normal violation? --- contradiction?
 - The envelope of acceptable action varies according to threat and demand (situation/context)
- There is a dynamic interaction between action, system and context
 - To understand this interaction each term needs first to be understood independently.
- Let us consider the operational system....

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Operational systems - the principle of relevance



- Reality of social systems - compelling force
 - Although imperfectly known
- Prioritising operational processes
 - Functional sequence linking input to outcome
- Other social processes may facilitate or inhibit operational processes
- Principle of relevance
 - Purpose of enquiry
 - Stakeholder interests

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'Causal structure' of operational processes



| | | |
|-------------------|--|--------------------|
| Technology driven | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Process transformation is done by technology •People monitor and control the process | Process industries |
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| People driven | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •People operate on technology in discrete tasks co-ordinated by people •Information technology can support this co-ordination | Aircraft maintenance |

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Critical sources of 'process strain'



| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| | Base maintenance | Line maintenance & dispatch | Approach and landing |
| Preconditions for initiating process | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Parallel dependencies between tasks | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Internal task dynamics | 3 | 3 | 1 |


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Social & technical systems




- The social system, organised as a set of operational processes, is what links people to technology in a functional way
- The operational system is not equivalent to a set of procedures
- The social system operates in between the set of HMIs which interface people & technology
- How to model this complex socio-technical system?

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Basic organising principles




- Operational processes
 - Functional/causal structure that sustains outputs
 - Integration of actions of humans & technology
 - Structure of local & remote dependencies defines critical path
- Social processes complement operational processes
 - Co-ordination mechanisms
 - Task and team structure
 - Quality of relationships - e.g. trust
- Information space
 - Co-ordination of action
 - Leverage of resources
 - Integrates social and technology systems
 - Can transform critical dependencies

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Identifying leverage - the critical path




- Elements
 - Actions of people, tools and technologies in the process
- Relations
 - Causal structure of operational process



Leverage suggests where and how to intervene to redesign, change or improve the system

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Identifying leverage - the critical path



The probability of successful transformation along a process is a function of the critical path and the resource demand balance (material, information and human) at each step

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Challenges



- For systems engineering
 - How to develop Human Factors / Organisation Theory as an integrated core discipline for design & management of complex systems
- For human & organisational factors
 - How to better address the material and social reality of operational systems

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